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The increased interest in ‘the North’ in the UK in the post-crisis period among 
scholars, policy-makers and, to some extent, the general public should not surprise us. 
The apparent over-reliance of the UK economy (and Exchequer revenues) on 
industries concentrated in London and the South East was regularly noted by policy 
elites, even before 2008. After the crisis, this notion became one of the major tropes 
of elite-level political discourses on the UK’s economic predicament (Berry and Hay, 
2016). However, the (re)emergence of the North as national-level political issue is 
reflective also of a more profound shift. Crises destroy complacency about the basic 
foundations of social organisation, of which physical space is probably the most 
fundamental. Place, and associated concerns around identity and belonging, has 
therefore become a key dimension of numerous political and policy dilemmas in the 
UK (Berry, 2016b). The North is not the only dimension upon which this emerging 
politics of place is evident; the crisis appears to have unleashed or unearthed a wider 
set of anxieties about the security of forms of spatial organisation – our home, our 
neighbourhood, our city, our country – which were once taken for granted, or more 
precisely, we once assumed were immune to the ebbs and flows of the wider 
economy.  
The recent rise of English national identity, and its politicisation, is perhaps the 
most important example of this anxiety for our purposes (see Kenny, 2014; Kenny, 
2015; Wyn Jones et al, 2012). The debate over the role and place of Scotland within 
the UK, thrown into sharp relief by the 2014 independence referendum and more 
recent arguments about a potential ‘IndyRef 2’, has also played an important role in 
accentuating the political relevance of place. On the one hand, ‘the Scottish question’ 
has helped to reinforce emerging grievances within England, promoting a reactionary 
type of nationalism which depicts the English people as being denied the rights 
enjoyed by other nations. We can speculate that this version of English anxiety was 
reflected, at least in part, by the UK’s vote to leave the European Union. On the other 
hand, and perhaps more importantly, the Scottish case has also prompted discussions 
revolving around a more progressive sense of place, especially in areas, such as the 
North of England, with distinctive regional identities (Willet and Giovannini, 2014). 
Indeed, there is evidence of an emerging ‘place-based self-discovery’ from the 
bottom-up in the North, reflected in the rise of civil society and political groups which 
uphold the civic and territorial distinctiveness of the North or its constituent parts 
(Giovannini, 2016). While such groups in the North invariably tend towards the pro-
remain position of their equivalents in Scotland, their political claims are clearly 
buttressed by an apparent desire to, in the words of the pro-Brexit campaign, ‘take 
back control’ among many local communities in England, not least the North. 
Of course, the political achievements of these groups in the North have, to date, 
been extremely limited. It appears at present that the right is the main beneficiary of 
England’s place-based political anxieties: the Conservative Party’s promotion of the 
Northern Powerhouse (and the devolution and local growth agendas more generally) 
since 2010 represents, unquestionably, an attempt to capitalise upon concerns about 
place in order to refresh its base of supporters in a post-crisis environment in which 
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previous political certainties have been undermined. To date, the traditional, 
nationally-constituted centre-left has not produced a compelling alternative (Berry, 
2016a). Attempts by various centre-left figures to commandeer the mantra of ‘take 
back control’ for their rather conventional liberal or social democratic political aims, 
albeit with support for devolution now more firmly central within their programmes, 
have yet to coalesce into a realisable political strategy. 
It is vital that scholarly attention is turned to the politics of place. But this alone 
would be insufficient to understand the pursuit of economic development in the 
North; we argue that a political economy of place is also required. What is happening 
in and to the North is part of much broader processes of capitalist restructuring, 
evident long before 2008, in which places are becoming more different and, at the 
same time, more connected. New, transnational patterns of inequality are one of the 
main characteristics of these processes, both transforming and reinforcing pre-existing 
geographical schisms in countries like the UK (McCann, 2016; Peck and Theodore, 
2007). In short, anxieties around place are intimately connected to questions around 
production and distribution. An understanding of both sets of issues is required if we 
are to explain not simply why policy elites are interested in the North, but why this 
interest has taken the form that is has, and the implications that related policy 
initiatives will have on the long-term development of the North and its constituent 
parts. This book offers only an initial foray into this intellectual agenda, drawing upon 
work undertaken by academic experts across a range of relevant disciplines. We are 
convinced, however, that both the rationale and the raw ingredients for a critically-
oriented ‘local political economy’ approach exists, combining economic geography’s 
focus on the spatiality of economic organisation, connections between sites of 
production and the unevenness of socio-economic life, and political economy’s 
abiding interest in the role of power, institutions and ideas – at the national and 
international levels – in determining how capitalist economies develop (Cox, 1987; 
Jones, 2015; MacKinnon et al, 2015; Martin, 2015; Watson, 2005). 
 
* 
 
While acknowledging the varied empirical focus and disciplinary background of the 
authors, we believe eight key lessons can be distilled from the book’s analyses. First, 
the multiple developmental dilemmas facing the North are very longstanding in 
nature. The 2008 economic crisis may have transformed the rubric through which 
these dilemmas are confronted, but has probably sharpened their bite as well as 
providing an opportunity to illuminate their obstinacy. Second, many chapters have 
stressed that the notion of the North-South divide dominates the debate on economic 
development in the North, and the governance of development, in ways that are no 
longer particularly productive. It is apparent that the North continues to be framed 
mainly in negative terms, insofar as it needs to ‘catch up’ to the South. However, the 
presence of spatial economic imbalance in the UK is not merely related to the idea of 
a ‘problematic North’; instead it is underpinned by a systemic London-centric bias, 
and should be understood as an entrenched, persistent and institutionalised feature of 
the national political economy. As such, the role of the South – and in particular the 
concentration of economic, financial and political power in London – in relation to 
the North needs to be problematised. Even if (parts of) the South could be said to 
represent an exemplar for the North to learn from, we would be required to 
acknowledge the role that the North’s subservience plays in the South’s 
developmental success. 
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Third, several accounts in the book have shed light on the limits of urban 
agglomeration in theory and practice. This epistemological framing currently provides 
a large part of the rationale for the Northern Powerhouse and related agendas, and has 
been absorbed into elite practices in the North, as well as national policy for the 
North. Agglomeration-based theory overlooks too much of what in practice is 
‘holding back’ the North, and the apparent enablement of agglomerative dynamics 
through public policy is likely to widen, rather than bridge, existing gaps not only 
between the North and the South, but also across the North. Fourth, the importance of 
appraising the politics of economic development in the North via an understanding of 
where Northern cities and regions are situated within wider domestic and international 
production processes, and, importantly, how the North’s status within these processes 
is upheld by the maintenance of a national growth model. Whilst the Northern 
Powerhouse (and, as discussed below, the devolution deals linked to it) touches upon 
post-crisis concerns around place and empowerment, beyond the rhetoric Northern 
regions continue to have limited powers over the structures and practices that govern 
their economic make-up. 
Fifth, one of the themes running throughout the book is the dysfunctional nature of 
the governance of economic development in the North. The introduction of new (and 
often overlapping) institutional structures from the top down, adding complexity to an 
already over-crowded system of governance, is a core trait of the governance system 
in this regard. Crucially, these new institutional arrangements graft onto a policy 
framework that is led by central government and lacks coherence, especially in terms 
of strategic co-ordination, long-term planning and funding – hindering the 
development of place-specific architectures and sub-national policy. Sixth, and related 
to this, the disorderly nature of this framework is epitomised by the uneven 
governance of devolution deals. While presented as key to unlocking economic 
development in the North, in practice ‘devo-deals’ are emerging as mere bespoke 
partnership agreements between national and local elites, which involve modest 
powers as well as vast liabilities, are based on artificial (and often problematic) 
functional geographies, and have little resonance among local communities. As 
emphasised by several contributions in this volume, devolution could benefit and 
empower those areas, such as Greater Manchester, that already have a degree of 
institutional maturity and experience of co-operation between local authorities. 
However, by the same token, other parts of the North where such frameworks are 
nascent or still missing could end up (and in many respects already are) being 
marginalised, fostering dynamics of local tribalism, competition and suspicion 
between localities – within which local interests supersede cross-regional and/or pan-
Northern ones.  
This points us towards the seventh main lesson that can be taken from the book, 
that is, the lack of democratic accountability evident in the devolution agenda and 
local governance processes in the North more generally. The top-down approach to 
state restructuring and institutional (re)arrangement promoted by central government 
has facilitated practices of inclusion and exclusion in the negotiation and decision-
making processes that underpin ‘devo deals’. Generally speaking, only certain actors 
(typically political leaders and business representatives in the so-called ‘core-cities’) 
have been granted a voice, and residents are seldom aware of, let alone involved in, 
the apparent transformation of the means by which their local economies are 
ostensibly being shaped. That the Northern Powerhouse and related initiatives have 
been justified precisely on the basis that they enhance local democracy serves to 
compound a longstanding ‘democratic deficit’ within the North. Finally, there are a 
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set of specific lessons – explored most extensively in the chapters by Bailey, and 
Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh – around tax reform and fiscal decentralisation. 
Moves towards making local authorities more dependent on the taxes they raise 
locally reinforces the structural disadvantage of the North. There are fewer profitable 
firms and wealthy individuals in Northern cities and regions from which tax revenue 
can be raised and, moreover, strong incentives for areas in the North to cut local taxes 
in the hope of attracting such firms and individuals into their jurisdiction (invariably 
creating mutually destructively competitive relations between different parts of the 
North). At the same time, local authorities are increasingly expected to shoulder the 
burden for financing public services in the context of austerity. More generally, the 
differential impact of austerity on the North features in several of the book’s chapters. 
 
* 
 
Politics is about power and, in simple terms, political economy is concerned with the 
role of political power in shaping economic life. While recognising that power takes 
many forms, and that the process for devolving some formal, institutional powers to 
some Northern city-regions is hugely flawed, our view – generally supported by the 
analyses of this book – is that the opportunity represented by the devolution agenda as 
it stands must be seized by the North. The devolution on offer is limited and 
conditional, and in some ways reinforces the North’s subservience within the national 
development model, but also arises in part from evident weaknesses in the UK’s over-
centralised political economy. There is a chance therefore that the North can push 
now for a more progressive, ambitious and genuinely empowering model of 
devolution, and one which assists efforts to construct a new role for Northern cities 
and regions in a transformed UK growth model. We should of course be under no 
illusion that more power to the North would allow it to buck the transnational 
core/periphery dynamics which shape its political-economic environments. 
Ultimately, however, more power is better than less power – especially given the 
disappointing track record of national political authorities in the UK in terms of 
supporting Northern regions in responding to wider shifts in capitalist organisation. 
Although it would be impossible to delineate a comprehensive agenda here, we 
believe several other, related policy reforms should be pursued in order to enable the 
North to develop its economy in a more sustainable manner. The devolution agenda 
must be based on a profound rethinking of centre-local relations; we should focus not 
only on rearranging local government, but also a radical transformation of governance 
structures at all levels, established in a new constitutional settlement. The centre itself 
would be reformed in this process, via reconsideration of the function of key 
macroeconomic policy bodies such as the Treasury and the Bank of England, the 
relocation of some of the core functions of government departments – and perhaps 
even Parliament – away from the capital. Reform of the upper chamber, the House of 
Lords, should include elements of regional representation. Moreover, the 
institutional reforms that do take place within local government in the North should 
not be constrained by prescriptive forms of governance imposed by the centre, which 
are increasingly based exclusively on the spatial imaginary of the city-region. We 
believe that the most suitable solution for the North would be to allow for the creation 
of multiple layers of political authority, that is, at metropolitan, regional, and pan-
Northern levels. 
Crucially, sub-national governance in the North should be democratised as well as 
federalised. In a political climate characterised by increasing levels of 
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disillusionment, devolution could and should provide an effective way to improve the 
relationship between citizens and the political system. To achieve this, local 
communities must be given a say over decisions concerning how the North should be 
governed, and should be actively engaged in the debate about their political and 
economic future. Too often, local political leaders in the North themselves seek to 
side-line the inputs of the communities they represent. They should instead seize the 
opportunity to provide a collective voice for their localities, their regions and the 
North in general – a platform which would in turn enhance their legitimacy in 
negotiations with the centre over power and resources. 
Economic development in the North will be impossible without a UK-wide 
industrial strategy that builds upon the economic strengths and potential of Northern 
cities and regions. Industrial strategy means that government thinks strategically 
about how to utilise its resources and the inherent strengths of the sovereign state 
(such as its longer time-horizons and unparalleled ability to spread risk) to improve 
the productive capacity of the economy. The UK has remarkably few robust organs of 
industrial strategy at either national or local levels – and those that have existed at the 
sub-national level have been effectively neutered or abolished in recent years, despite 
the rhetorical focus on ‘rebalancing’ among policy elites. At the same time, it is clear 
that the UK state has pursued an industrial strategy by other means in recent decades, 
to the benefit of the finance sector and the City of London. That this strategy has 
proven unsustainable in developmental terms (from a national perspective) underlines 
the need for an industrial strategy that is place-based rather than place-blind, 
recognising the particular assets of different areas rather than assuming each can or 
should seek to replicate the local developmental model of London. Northern cities and 
regions must be mobilised in service of a new, nationwide industrial strategy and, at 
the same time, empowered to determine the specific mix of industrial policy measures 
appropriate to their local economies.  
The inherent bias of financial institutions to London-based economic activity – an 
inevitable consequence of a London-centric growth model – means that reforms to the 
regulation of the banking sector and capital markets must be central to any industrial 
policy agenda. This would better enable much-needed infrastructure investment in the 
North, which is presently disincentivised within finance sector business models, but 
more generally provide greater opportunities for long-term capital investment by 
private companies. At a seemingly more mundane level, local authorities must be able 
to devote greater resources to understanding the local economies over which they 
preside. The provision of detailed information on the composition and performance of 
local economies in England is inadequate and, coupled with a lack of economic and 
industrial policy expertise among local officials, serves to undermine the North’s 
ability to demonstrate its particular needs, and indeed its value to the national 
economy. Furthermore, it is vital that the interests of the North are central to the 
Brexit process. At the very least, European funds invested into the North must be 
replaced, and enhanced, by the UK government in due course. More fundamentally, 
given the significance to European production networks to productive activity in the 
North, Northern cities and regions must be treated by central government as a partner 
when negotiating a new trading relationship with the continuing EU. 
The question of fiscal decentralisation hangs over any attempt to devolve 
meaningful economic powers to the local level. It is clear that the reform of local 
taxes associated with the Northern Powerhouse and devolution agendas poses a 
serious challenge to economic development in the North. New freedoms to raise local 
business and property taxes is connected to efforts to paper over the cracks in public 
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services created by austerity, and new freedoms to lower local taxes constitutes an 
attempt by central government to instil a ‘race to the bottom’ among local authorities 
in order to attract exogenous investment in high-employment (but low-wage) sectors. 
The developmental model implied by this scenario is not one that is likely to benefit 
the North. It is not appropriate for any locality, particularly structurally disadvantaged 
areas in the North, to become more dependent on the revenue it is able to raise only 
within its own boundaries to fund local government. Instead, comprehensive tax 
reform should be subject to a new centre-local settlement, enabling more 
opportunities, not fewer, for the redistribution of tax revenues between areas – as well 
as providing for a more nimble tax system that can prevent over-heating in certain 
local economies where necessary, and better ensures the success of prosperous areas 
is not threatened by a lack of economic resilience elsewhere in the domestic economy 
that they are inherently dependent upon (Engelen et al, 2016). This does not mean 
that local authorities should not have some tax powers; they should, for instance, have 
the ability to adjust national tax policies locally in order combat rent-seeking 
behaviour connected to land and property holdings, as and when such behaviour 
stands in the way of local economic development. 
 There is also an array of more limited and straightforward reforms that could 
make a significant difference to local economic development in the North (see 
McInroy et al, 2016). For example, national purchasing frameworks and restrictive 
procurement practices prevent local economies from utilising the potential of ‘anchor 
institutions’ within their economy. Anchors are organisations which have a sizeable 
local presence, usually through a combination of being large-scale employers, one of 
the largest purchasers of goods and services in the locality, controlling large areas of 
land, and/or having relatively fixed assets. Arguably, the North’s economy is stronger 
than it appears, given the location of anchors within ‘foundational’ economic sectors 
such as health and education, yet it is not sufficiently able to build upon this strength 
in the construction of a development model more tailored to the characteristics of 
constituent cities and regions. Local authorities should be empowered to use their own 
purchasing power – and direct that of locally rooted employers – to, for instance, 
encourage suppliers to create quality career progression opportunities for their 
workforces, provide support to the voluntary and community sector, and indeed invest 
in local supply chain development.  The notion of anchor institutions is usually 
applied to public sector or pseudo-public sector organisations, but its logic could be 
extended to the private sector, whereby large private firms were supported to operate 
in the local economy on the basis of a social license which would ensure their profit-
making activities are aligned with local developmental needs (Bowman et al, 2014). 
Above all, and encompassing all the points raised thus far, the dominant narrative 
that portrays the North as inherently problematic should be reversed. In many 
respects, such top-down, London-centric framing of the North has been internalised 
by national and local elites, and is reflected in the current devolution and Northern 
Powerhouse agenda. Yet while the North has distinctive characteristics, it is not 
uniquely disadvantaged, and the path towards de-development is not set in stone. A 
national conversation that focuses on the ‘divide’ between the North and South – 
while rightly illuminating endemic inequalities – leads to the political-economic 
interactions between different parts of the UK being overlooked and under-theorised. 
Similarly, a seemingly progressive agenda focused on helping the North to ‘catch up’ 
to more developed local economies is a narrative which paints the North as failing, 
rather than constrained.  We need to turn the current motifs of ‘empowerment’ and 
‘localism’ from rhetoric into reality. To achieve this, local leaders need to be bolder, 
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and to coalesce, overcoming local tribalism, and focusing on building cohesive 
political agenda across the Northern regions. They should also mobilise and find 
strength in the local and regional identities that characterise the North – so as to build 
an inclusive political project based on shared civic and community values that speaks 
both for and to the people, and aims at actively involving them in the construction of a 
more progressive and sustainable developmental path. 
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